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A Proper Yield Curve for Greece 
to Kick-Start Financial Intermediation 
Christian Kopf and Miranda Xafa 
t  present,  the  market  is  severely  mispricing  Greece’s  sovereign  risk  relative  to  the  country’s 
fundamentals.  As  a  result  of  the  mispricing,  financial  intermediation  in  Greece  has  become 
dysfunctional and the privatisation of state-owned assets has stalled. This mispricing is partially due to 
an illiquid and fragmented government yield curve. A well-designed public liability management exercise can 
lead to a more efficient pricing of Greece’s government bonds and thereby help restore stable and affordable 
financing for the country’s private sector, which is imperative in order to overcome Greece’s deep recession. We 
propose three measures to enhance the functioning of the Greek government debt market: i) Greece should 
issue a new five-year bond, ii) it should consolidate the 20 individual series of government bonds into four liquid 
securities  and  iii)  it  should  offer  investors  a  swap  of  these  newly  created  bonds  into  dollar-denominated 
securities. Each of these measures would be beneficial to the Hellenic Republic, since the government would be 
able to reduce the face value and the net present  value of its debt stock. Furthermore, this exercise would 
facilitate  the  resumption  of  market  access,  which  is  a  necessary  condition  for  continuous  multilateral 
disbursements to Greece. 
 
1. Three and a half years into the debt crisis, and 
notwithstanding  a  large-scale  debt  exchange  and 
buyback  in  2012,  Greek  government  bonds 
continue  to  trade  at  the  widest  credit  spreads 
within the euro area. While the yield spreads of other 
peripheral  euro  area  credits  have  tightened 
significantly after the ECB’s pledge to “do whatever it 
takes”  to  save  the  euro  in  July  2012,  and  the 
subsequent  OMT  (Outright  Monetary  Transaction) 
announcement,  Greece  remains  an  outlier  in  the 
sovereign credit  market. As Figure 1 shows, the 10-
year  yield  on  Greek  Government  Bonds  (GGBs), 
although far below the peak reached in late 2011, is 
still very high at 8.5% and remains above the yield of 
emerging market bonds that trade at distressed levels.  
2. High spreads on Greece’s public and private debt 
persist in spite of the country’s rapid progress in 
fiscal  consolidation,  its  debt  restructuring, 
competitiveness gains and bank recapitalisation. 
The  Greek  government  has  undertaken  a  cumulative 
adjustment  of the public sector’s primary balance  of 
more than 8% of GDP (and of more than 14% of GDP 
in cyclically adjusted terms) since 2009 (IMF, 2013a). 
The  country  also  has  already  received  considerable 
debt relief from private and official creditors. In March 
2012,  Greece  concluded  a  debt  restructuring  that 
eliminated  €106  billion  of  its  sovereign  debt  due  to 
private bondholders, while borrowing €30 billion from 
the  EFSF  (European  Financial  Stability  Facility)  to 
provide credit enhancement. The deal cleared the way 
for a €130 billion second EU/IMF rescue package for 
Greece,  which  includes  the  €30  billion  official 
contribution to the bond exchange. Some €50 billion 
out  of  the  new  rescue  package  was  set  aside  to 
recapitalise  Greek  banks,  which  saw  a  dramatic 
impairment  of  the  value  of  their  holdings  of  GGBs, 
adding to the strains imposed by deposit withdrawals 
and  non-performing  loan  losses  as  the  recession 
deepened (Xafa, 2013).  
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Figure 1. Ten-year government bond yield spread over German Bunds, in basis points 
 
Sources: Bloomberg, authors’ calculations. 
In the spring of 2012, euro area creditors also agreed to 
reduce the spread over Euribor on the bilateral loans 
that funded the first rescue package (the Greek Loan 
Facility  or GLF) from 300 basis points to 150 basis 
points retroactively to March 2011, and to extend the 
average maturity of these loans from 10 to 15 years. In 
late November 2012, the Eurogroup decided to provide 
further  debt  relief  to  Greece  by  postponing  interest 
payments  due  to  the  EFSF,  reducing  further  the 
interest margin on GLF loans from 150 basis points to 
50  basis  points,  deferring  interest  on  EFSF  loans, 
cancelling the EFSF guarantee commitment, extending 
the maturities of EFSF and GLF loans, and passing on 
to Greece the income on the ECB’s Securities Market 
Programme  portfolio  (including  capital  gains)  as  of 
2013.  This  debt  relief  will  be  provided  in  a  phased 
manner,  conditional  on  full  implementation  of  the 
agreed  adjustment  measures  (European  Commission, 
2012).  
Taken  together,  these  measures  will  contribute  €8.2 
billion in additional financing over the period 2013-16 
and reduce the debt stock by 7.2% of GDP by 2020 
(European  Commission,  2012).  Moreover,  Greece 
conducted a debt buyback of the newly-issued GGBs 
in  December  2012,  which  eliminated  a  further 
€32 billion of debt at a cost of €11 billion, reducing the 
debt ratio by 10.8% of GDP in net terms. At the same 
time,  the  Eurogroup  committed  to  providing  further 
official  debt  relief,  conditional  on  full  programme 
implementation,  if  needed  to  “bring  Greece’s  public 
debt on a sustainable path [...] and facilitate a gradual 
return  to  market  financing”,  when  Greece  reaches  a 
primary surplus. The current programme envisages a 
decline in the debt ratio to 124% of GDP in 2020 and 
to “substantially below” 110% of GDP in 2022 from 
176% of GDP at end-2013. Also, Greece faces near-
zero rollover risk over the next decade, when less than 
10% of the debt stock matures.  
3.  At  present,  Greek  sovereign  risk  is  severely 
mispriced relative to the country’s fundamentals. In 
the run-up to the European sovereign debt crisis, the 
IMF  had  shown  that  a  small  number  of 
macroeconomic  determinants  did  a  good  job  in 
explaining the market-implied probability of default of 
sovereign debt that is traded in the form of sovereign 
default  swaps  (IMF,  2010).  At  the  time,  more  than 
three-quarters of Greece’s sovereign spread could be 
explained  by  the  government’s  required  fiscal 
adjustment  to  restore  solvency  and  by  the  flow  and 
stock of its external liabilities. Today, however, it is 
difficult to explain the risk premium attached to Greek 
government  debt  via  these  solvency  metrics,  and 
Greek risk appears to be mispriced.  
A  new  CDS  (credit  default  swap)  market  for  Greek 
sovereign  debt  has  only  appeared  very  recently,  and 
the  sovereign  currently  trades  at  a  CDS  spread  of 
around  800  basis  points  for  the  standard  five-year 
tenure, while new Greek government bonds trade at a 
spread of around 650 basis points over the euro swaps 
curve. In Table 1, we compare Greece’s sovereign risk 
premium to a peer  group  of other sovereign debtors 
that  share  the  country’s  rating  and/or  its  fiscal 
challenges  and  external  vulnerabilities.  Specifically, 
we look at four solvency metrics: 
i)  The fiscal adjustment between 2013 and 2020 that 
is required in order to achieve a public debt target 
of  60%  of  GDP  for  advanced  economies  and  to 
bring the debt down to 40% of GDP for emerging 
market  economies.  This  ‘sustainability  gap’  has 
been  calculated  by  the  IMF  in  its  latest  Fiscal 
Monitor  (IMF,  2013b).  It  has  the  advantage  of 
combining  into  one  number  the  key  elements  of 
public  debt  sustainability  analysis:  namely  the 
current  primary  balance,  the  stock  of  debt,  the 
average  interest  rate  on  the  debt,  the  real  trend 
growth  rate  of  the  economy  and  trend  inflation. A Proper Yield Curve for Greece to Kick-Start Financial Intermediation |3 
 
 
Thereby,  this  concept  avoids  the  pitfalls  of 
focusing exclusively on the level of the debt stock, 
which  may  be  misleading  if  the  debt  has  a  low 
interest rate and a long maturity.  
ii)  Foreign  bank  claims  on  the  public  sector,  as  a 
proxy  for  the  relevant  portion  of  the  net 
international investment position. 
iii) The  current  account  balance  as  a  proxy  for  the 
country’s competitiveness. 
iv) The  sovereign  ratings,  as  set  by  Moody’s  and 
Standard and Poor’s.  
Table 1. Public debt solvency indicators (percent of GDP) 
Country  Rating 
(Moody’s/S&P) 
BIS bank claims 
on public sector 
Current account 
balance 
Required fiscal 
adjustment 
5-year sovereign 
CDS spread 
Ukraine  Caa1/B-  1.4  -7.3  3.4  1,100 
Pakistan  Caa1/B-  0.8  -1.0  5.5  890 
Greece  Caa3/B-  8.5  -1.0  2.1  800 
Egypt  Caa1/CCC+  0.6  -2.6  12.0  630 
Portugal  Ba3/BB  9.3  0.9  4.9  335 
Morocco  Ba1/BBB-  2.4  -7.2  6.1  225 
Italy  Baa2/BBB  11.2  0.0  2.1  177 
Spain  Baa3/BBB-  5.6  1.4  6.1  155 
Ireland  Ba1/BBB+  4.4  2.3  6.3  120 
Sources: IMF, BIS, authors’ calculations. Market levels are as of 3 December 2013. 
The  ensemble  of  these  metrics  can  only  provide  a 
rough  indication  of a sovereign’s solvency and  each 
one of them is subject to many shortcomings. Still, we 
can see that within its rating category, Greece is the 
country  with  the  lowest  current  account  deficit  and 
with the lowest fiscal adjustment needs by far, a fact 
that  is  not  fully  reflected  in  its  sovereign  spread. 
Compared  to  other  fiscally  challenged  countries  in 
Europe and North Africa, we can again observe that 
Greece’s  necessary  consolidation  has  almost  been 
completed,  while  Ireland,  Spain,  Morocco  and 
Portugal  all  need  to  undertake  fiscal  adjustments  of 
more than twice the size. Again, this is not reflected in 
Greece’s sovereign spreads.  
It is impossible to derive fair value estimates for Greek 
sovereign CDS with a simple regression analysis, since 
coefficients are unstable over time (and actually even 
change signs). Still, one has to wonder whether Greece 
should really trade at a wider credit spread than Egypt, 
a  country  that  still  has  to  undertake  a  sizable 
adjustment  effort  in  order  to  restore  fiscal 
sustainability.  At  present,  we  believe  that  even 
considering  all  of  Greece’s  balance  sheet 
vulnerabilities, the country’s sovereign debt appears to 
be trading around 100 to 200 basis points too  wide. 
This may in part be related to the stigma of Greece’s 
2012 sovereign  debt restructuring. However, we  will 
show  that  the  mispricing  is  likely  also  due  to  the 
structure of Greece’s privately held public debt.  
 
4. As a result of the  mispricing of sovereign risk, 
financial  intermediation  in  Greece  has  become 
dysfunctional. With sovereign credit spreads serving 
as  a  benchmark  for  commercial  borrowing,  Greek 
corporates  and  SMEs  borrow  at  very  high  rates 
compared  to  their  northern  European  counterparts. 
Large Greek corporates (OTE telecoms, Titan cement, 
Hellenic Petroleum, S&B Minerals, and Intralot) have 
tapped  the  bond  market  with  five-year  issues  with 
coupons between 8% and 9¾%. Others, however, have 
decided  to  move  their  corporate  headquarters  to 
western Europe in order to access credit at lower rates. 
Since  mid-2012,  the  independent  Greek  Coca  Cola 
bottler, S&B Minerals, and recently Viohalco, a metals 
processing firm, have been  delisted from the  Athens 
Stock  Exchange  and  have  either  been  listed  on 
exchanges in Brussels or Geneva, or are privately held. 
By contrast, SMEs, which account for 70% of value 
added and 85% of employment, have been hard-hit by 
their  heavy  dependence  on  bank  lending  which  has 
become both scarce and expensive.  
5.  The  mispricing  of  sovereign  risk  is  one  of  the 
reasons why privatisation of state-owned assets has 
stalled.  Faced  with  falling  private  savings  and  high 
interest rates, Greece urgently needs to attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to help its economy grow and 
create jobs. The obvious vehicle for such investment is 
the  privatisation  programme  which  has 
underperformed so far, raising total revenues of only 
€2 billion since 2011. We believe that the privatisation 
programme  will  continue  to  underperform  if  Greece 4 | Kopf & Xafa 
 
does not deal with the deep valuation discount on its 
GGBs.  Any  private-sector  agent  considering  an 
investment in a Greek company (whether in the form 
of loans, bonds, listed equity or private equity) faces 
the  opportunity  cost  of  not  investing  in  Greek 
government  bonds,  which  currently  pay  a  yield  of 
around 8.5%. It is difficult to envision a situation  in 
which Greek companies will continue to thrive in the 
face  of  another  sovereign  default.  Therefore,  private 
sector agents will typically discount any investments in 
Greek companies with the GGB yield (to account for 
systemic risk) and apply an additional risk premium 
which reflects the company’s idiosyncratic risk. This 
implies  that  private-sector  agents  will  typically 
discount investments in Greek companies at a double-
digit yield, which will seldom result in a positive net 
present  value  (NPV).  Therefore,  the  privatisation  of 
state-owned assets, foreign direct investments or any 
other form of investment in the Greek economy will 
not  occur in  meaningful size as long as government 
bonds offer such outstanding return potential. Only a 
substantial  decline  in  government-bond  yields  will 
stop  crowding  out  lending  to  and  investing  in  the 
private sector in Greece.  
6.  In  order  to  overcome  the  country’s  deep 
recession, it is imperative that stable and affordable 
financing  for  the  private  sector  is  restored.  The 
Greek economy currently has a very high level of idle 
resources,  as  evidenced  by  high  unemployment  and 
low capacity utilisation in manufacturing. Fixed capital 
formation has dropped by more than 60% in real terms 
since the peak reached in the fourth quarter of 2007. 
Directed bank lending at below-market rates can help 
to avoid a worsening of the situation, but would hurt 
bank profitability given high funding costs. Ultimately, 
the market interest rates that the private sector faces 
need  to  be  brought  down  –  otherwise,  Greece’s 
macroeconomic  adjustment  programme  will  fail  to 
induce a recovery of economic activity. In this respect, 
the  most  important  prerequisite  for  a  reactivation  of 
private  sector  economic  activity  and  investment  is  a 
reduction  in  the  excessive  risk  premium  on  Greek 
government bonds.  
 
 
7.  A  well-designed  liability  management  exercise 
can  contribute  to  a  more  effective  pricing  of 
Greece’s  government  bonds  and  thereby  improve 
market functioning. There are a number of binding 
constraints  on  any  such  exercise,  namely  i)  money 
should  not  be  raised  to  close  any  financing  gaps  in 
Greece’s  macroeconomic adjustment programme and 
ii) any operation should provide the government with 
debt  relief  in  NPV  terms.  For  the  purpose  of  the 
second  criterion,  we  will  discount  all  of  Greece’s 
liabilities from the issuers’ perspective using discount 
rates of 3.5% and 5%, which represent two “different 
guesses for the rates at which Greece might be able to 
transfer revenues over time, based on borrowing from 
either the market after it reopens or from the EFSF” 
(Zettelmeyer et al., 2013). 
8. At present, the Greek government bond market 
is fragmented and offers scarce liquidity. After the 
February  2012  debt  restructuring  and  the  December 
2012 buyback, there is a total stock of €29.6 billion of 
new  Greek  government  bonds  left  in  the  market, 
consisting  of  20  series  of  around  €1.4  billion  each, 
with annual maturities between 2023 and 2042 (Xafa, 
2013).  
These new bonds currently trade at a yield of around 
8.5%, with almost all trading conducted in the ‘GGB 
strip’, in which market participants agree to buy or sell 
a total face amount of bonds that is then split into 20 
equal  notionals.  In  other  words,  market  participants 
typically buy or sell the entire yield curve in one go 
because  this  is  the  only  liquid  way  to  trade  Greek 
bonds.  There  is  also  a  stock  of  €16.1  billion  in 
Treasury bills with maturities of up to six months that 
trade  at  yields  of  2.5%  to  3.5%  and  are  almost 
exclusively held by Greek banks.  
The  settlement  of  transactions  in  new  GGBs  is 
somewhat complicated, not only because every trade 
typically  requires  20  tickets,  but  also  because  these 
instruments carry a step-up coupon that increases from 
2% to 4.2% over the life of the bonds. What is missing 
on the  yield curve is a liquid five-year plain  vanilla 
bond  that  can  be  used  as  a  benchmark  for  private-
sector  financial  intermediation.  Figure  2  on  the 
following page shows the current Greek government 
bond yield curve  with the  existing 20 GGBs, the T-
bills and the proposed new five-year bond.  A Proper Yield Curve for Greece to Kick-Start Financial Intermediation |5 
 
 
Figure 2. Greece’s government bond yield curve 
 
Source: Bloomberg, market levels as of 3 December 2013. 
Figure 3. Amortisation schedule for the Greek government 
 
Source: IMF (2013a). 
 
Apart from new government bonds and Treasury bills, 
the Greek  government  is facing amortisations  of  old 
government bonds  which the Eurosystem bought for 
the  Security  Market  Programme  (SMP)  and  for  the 
ANFA accounts of national central banks prior to the 
2012  debt  restructuring  (ECB  holdings).  These 
instruments have not been restructured, in violation of 
the  principles  of  preference  avoidance  and 
comparability of treatment (Kopf, 2013). Furthermore, 
there  are  scheduled  repayments  to  the  IMF  and  to 
Greece’s  European  partners.  Figure  3  provides  a 
summary  of  these  scheduled  debt  repayments  in  the 
coming  years  and  demonstrates  that  amortisation 
payments on new GGBs only amount to a minuscule 
part of Greece’s overall public service.  
9. We propose three liability management measures 
to enhance the functioning of the government debt 
market  in  Greece.  Specifically,  we  believe  that 
Greece  should  i)  issue  a  new  five-year  bond,  ii) 
consolidate the 20 individual series of the ‘GGB strip’ 
into four liquid bonds and iii) swap euro-denominated 
bonds into dollar-denominated bonds.  
10.  Greece  should  issue  a  new  five-year  bond.  In 
order to achieve lower government bond yields and to 
provide a reference point for private-sector financing, 
the  Greek  government  bond-yield  curve  needs  to  be 
anchored at the front end. At present, the yield curve is 
segmented  in  two  parts:  there  are  short-term  T-bills 
with yields of around 3% and tenures of three to six 
months, and there are long-term bonds with yields of 
around 8.5% and tenures of 10 to 30 years. What is 
missing is a five-year point on the government bond 
yield  curve  that  could  serve  as  a  reference  for  the 
pricing of new credit to the private sector and for the 
discounting of new private-sector investments, such as 
FDI and privatisations. Furthermore, a new five-year 
bond  would  open  the  Greek  bond  market  to  a  new 
investor base, since many European mutual funds and 6 | Kopf & Xafa 
 
insurance  companies  are  reluctant  to  commit 
themselves to ten-year instruments, while they would 
consider a shorter bond as a viable strategy to re-gain 
exposure to Greece. 
11.  Greece  should  offer  investors  a  swap  of  their 
existing holdings of the 20 series of new GGBs into 
four  liquid  bonds  with  maturities  in  2025,  2030, 
2035  and  2040.  Specifically,  holders  of  new  Greek 
government bonds  maturing between 2023 and 2027 
should be  invited to swap their  holdings  into a  new 
2025 bond; holders of existing bonds with maturities 
between 2028 and 2032 should be invited to swap their 
bonds  into  a  new  2030  bond,  etc.  As  a  result,  a 
significant  portion  of  new  Greek  government  bonds 
would migrate into four relatively liquid instruments, 
which would allow investors to trade individual Greek 
bonds with acceptable liquidity and articulate duration 
views on the yield curve. 
12.  Greece  should  offer  investors  a  swap  of  the 
newly  created  2018,  2025,  2030,  2035  and  2040 
bonds  into  dollar-denominated  securities.  At 
present, the investor base for European sovereign debt 
that is subject to  elevated credit risk consists almost 
exclusively  of  dollar-based  investors  (mainly  former 
and current Emerging Markets bond fund managers). 
Many  of these  institutional investors shy away  from 
purchases  of  euro-denominated  bonds  due  to 
difficulties  related  to  the  hedging  of  their  currency 
exposure.  Furthermore,  the  main  fund  benchmarks 
such as JP Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index 
consist  of  dollar-denominated  plain  vanilla  bonds 
(with no step-up coupons, etc.) and issuance of bonds 
that can be included in these indices gives access to 
large pools of captive demand. This is the main reason 
why Croatia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and other 
European sovereigns have shifted a significant portion 
of  their  issuance  into  the  dollar  market.  They  have 
been  rewarded  for  this  strategy  with  much  lower 
borrowing  costs,  and  most  of  these  sovereigns 
regularly swap the proceeds of the bond and the debt 
servicing cash flows back into euros at issuance. We 
believe  that  Greece  would  be  able  to  issue  dollar-
denominated  bonds  at  an  asset  swap  spread  that  is 
significantly  lower  than  current  secondary  market 
levels for its euro-denominated GGBs.  
13. These liability management exercises would be 
beneficial to the Hellenic Republic. We have laid out 
in point 9 above that any such exercise must i) not be 
used to issue more debt, but to retire debt instead and 
ii)  must  provide  the  government  with  debt  relief  in 
NPV terms.  
The  Greek  government  could  today  issue  €4  billion 
notional of a new plain-vanilla bond with maturity on 
24 February 2018, a coupon rate of 6% and an issue 
price of 100% of face value. It could then use the €4 
billion in proceeds to retire €6 billion notional of the 
existing Greek government bond with maturity on 24 
February 2023 at a market price of 65.4% of face value 
and  a  yield  of  8.65%.  This  simultaneous  issue  and 
repurchase transaction could be conducted in the form 
of a ratio swap with existing holders. The results are 
summarised in Table 2. The stock of public debt would 
decline  by  €2  billion,  which  would  provide  Greece 
with  debt  relief.  If  the  Greek  government  discounts 
both the old and the new obligation at a rate of 3.5%, it 
would achieve a NPV gain of €1.56 billion (by retiring 
debt worth €5.95 billion and issuing debt worth € 4.39 
billion). At a discount rate of 5%, the NPV gain would 
amount to €1.12 billion. If the ratio swap is carried out 
for  existing  bonds  with  longer  maturities,  the  gains 
would be substantially higher, since these bonds trade 
at lower cash prices. 
Table 2. Illustrative results of liability management 
exercise from the issuer’s perspective 
  3.5% 
Discount 
rate 
5% 
Discount 
rate 
Issuance of new 2018 bond     
– Increase in face value  €4.00 bn  €4.00 bn 
– Increase in debt NPV  €4.39 bn  €4.15 bn 
Repurchase of existing 2023 
bonds 
   
– Reduction in face value  €6.00 bn  €6.00 bn 
– Reduction in debt NPV  €5.95 bn  €5.27 bn 
Net debt relief     
– Reduction in face value  €2.00 bn  €2.00 bn 
– Reduction in debt NPV  €1.56 bn  €1.12 bn 
Sources: Authors’ own calculations. 
In order to ensure that the Greek government achieves 
such debt stock reductions and NPV gains at current 
market  prices,  the  Greek  government  could  auction 
warrants that allow holders of existing bonds to swap 
their  holdings  into  new  2018  bonds.  (Mexico  has 
carried out similar auctions in its liability management 
operations in the past.) The proceeds from the sale of 
exchange warrants would generate an additional source 
of revenue for the Greek government and it would lock 
in the desired swap ratio before the transaction takes 
place.  
Some will argue that existing bondholders would not 
voluntarily  participate  in  such  an  exchange  if  the 
parameters are set in a way that provides NPV gains to 
the  issuer.  However,  experience  with  voluntary 
liability  management  exercises  carried  out  by  many 
Emerging Markets sovereign  issuers such as Mexico 
and  Brazil  as  well  as  by  Ireland  and  Portugal  has 
proven otherwise. The key issue here are the dynamic 
effects  on  the  pricing  of  sovereign  risk  that  this 
liability management exercise sets into motion; in this A Proper Yield Curve for Greece to Kick-Start Financial Intermediation |7 
 
 
sense,  such  bond  exchanges  can  have  a  catalytic 
character. By bringing in potential  investors that are 
constrained to dollar-denominated and/or plain vanilla 
instruments, a successful exchange would broaden the 
investor base for Greek government bonds. The result 
would be capital gains not only on the new bonds, but 
also on existing GGBs. By swapping a portion of their 
holdings of the ‘GGB strip’ into a new five-year bond, 
existing investors would benefit from a more efficient 
pricing of Greek risk at the price of giving up some of 
the convexity of holding deeply discounted bonds. 
The  swap  of  the  ‘GGB  strip’  into  four  more  liquid 
instruments would likely be NPV neutral at inception, 
but  the  Greek  government  would  gain  from  this 
exercise since  it  will benefit from a less fragmented 
and more liquid market over time.  
14. This liability management exercise will facilitate 
the  resumption  of  market  access,  which  is  a 
necessary  condition  for  continuous  multilateral 
disbursements  to  Greece.  Greece  is  currently 
receiving  IMF  financing  under  exceptional  access 
criteria. One of the prerequisites for this type of IMF 
funding is that Greece “has prospects for  gaining  or 
regaining access to private capital markets within the 
timeframe  when  Fund  resources  are  outstanding”. 
Restoring market access is thus a stated objective of 
the  current  multilateral  assistance  programme  for 
Greece (see IMF, 2013a, p. 38). Facilitating a gradual 
return to market financing is also a stated objective of 
Greece’s  European  partners  (European  Commission, 
2012). The ability of the Greek sovereign to refinance 
itself at acceptable interest rates reduces the risk that 
further multilateral assistance has to be granted to the 
country.  By  placing  a  new  2018  bond  on  the  yield 
curve via a debt swap, Greece may potentially be able 
to  tap  this  instrument  at  a  later  stage,  which  would 
reduce  the  need  for  increased  multilateral 
disbursements. 
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